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Herbrand Consistency of Some Arithmetical Theories
Abstract
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem is proved for Herbrand consistency of some arithmetical
theories with bounded induction, by using a technique of logarithmic shrinking the witnesses of
bounded formulas, due to Z. Adamowicz [Herbrand consistency and bounded arithmetic, Fundamenta
Mathematicae 171 (2002) 279–292]. In that paper, it was shown that one cannot always shrink the
witness of a bounded formula logarithmically, but in the presence of Herbrand consistency, for theories
I∆0 + Ωm with m > 2, any witness for any bounded formula can be shortened logarithmically. This
immediately implies the unprovability of Herbrand consistency of a theory T ⊇ I∆0 + Ω2 in T itself.
In this paper, the above results are generalized for I∆0 + Ω1. Also after tailoring the definition
of Herbrand consistency for I∆0 we prove the corresponding theorems for I∆0. Thus the Herbrand
version of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem follows for the theories I∆0 + Ω1 and I∆0.
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1 Introduction
By Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem Truth is not the same as Provability in sufficiently strong theories.
In other words, Provable is a proper subset of True, and thus True is not conservative over Provable. It is not
even Π1−conservative; i.e., there exists a Π1−formula, in theories which can interpret enough arithmetic,
which is true but unprovable in those theories. Thus one way of comparing the strength of a theory T
over one of its sub-theories S is considering the Π1−conservativeness of T over S. And Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem provides such a Π1−candidate: Con(S), the statement of the consistency of S.
By that theorem S 6` Con(S), but if T ` Con(S) then T is not Π1−conservative over S.
Examples abound in mathematics and logic: Zermelo-Frankel Set Theory ZFC is not Π1−conservative
over Peano’s Arithmetic PA, because ZFC ` Con(PA) but PA 6` Con(PA). Inside PA the Σn−hierarchy
is not a Π1−conservative hierarchy, since IΣn+1 ` Con(IΣn) though IΣn 6` Con(IΣn); see e.g. [7]. Then
below the theory IΣ1 things get more complicated: for Π1−separating I∆0 + Exp over I∆0 the candidate
Con(I∆0) does not work, because I∆0 + Exp 6` Con(I∆0). For this Π1−separation, Paris and Wilkie [10]
suggested the notion of cut-free consistency instead of usual - Hilbert style - consistency predicate. Here
one can show that I∆0 + Exp ` CFCon(I∆0), and then it was presumed that I∆0 6` CFCon(I∆0), where
CFCon stands for cut-free consistency. But this presumption took a rather long time to be established.
Meanwhile, Pudla´k in [11] established the Π1−separation of I∆0 + Exp over I∆0 by other methods, and
mentioned the unprovability of CFCon(I∆0) in I∆0 as an open problem. This problem is interesting in its
own right. Indeed Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem has been generalized to all consistent theories
containing Robinson’s Arithmetic Q, in the case of Hilbert consistency; see [7]. But for cut-free consistency
it is still an open problem whether the theorem holds for Q, and its not too strong extensions. This is a
double strengthening of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem: weakening the theory and weakening the
consistency predicate. Let us note that since cut-free provability is stronger than usual Hilbert provability
(with a super-exponential cost), then cut free consistency is a weaker notion of consistency. Indeed, proving
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for weak notions of consistencies in weak arithmetics turns out to
be a difficult problem. We do not intend here to give a thorough history of this ongoing research area, let
us just mention a few results:
• Z. Adamowicz was the first one to demonstrate the unprovability of cut free consistency in bounded
arithmetics, by proving in an unpublished manuscript in 1999 (later appeared as a technical report [1])
that the tableau consistency of I∆0 + Ω1 is not provable in itself. Later with P. Zbierski (2001) she proved
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for Herbrand consistency of I∆0 + Ω2 (see [2]), and a bit later she
gave a model theoretic proof of it in 2002; see [3].
• D. E. Willard introduced an I∆0−provable Π1−formula V and showed that any theory whose axioms
contains Q + V cannot prove its own tableaux consistency. He also showed that tableaux consistency of
I∆0 is not provable in itself, see [14, 15]; this proved the conjecture of Paris and Wilkie mentioned above.
• S. Salehi (see [13] Chapter 3 and also [12]) showed the unprovability of Herbrand consistency of a
re-axiomatization of I∆0 in itself, the proof of which was heavily based on [2]. The re-axiomatization used
PA−, the theory of the positive fragment of a discretely ordered ring, as the base theory, instead of Q, and
assumed two I∆0−derivable sentences as axioms. Also the model-theoretic proof of Z. Adamowicz in [3]
was generalized to the I∆0 + Ω1 case in Chapter 5 of [13]. A polished and updated proof of it appears in
the present paper.
• L. A. Ko lodziejczyk showed in [8] that the notion of Herbrand consistency cannot Π1−separate the
hierarchy of bounded arithmetics (this Π1−separation is still an open problem). Main results are the
existence of an n for any given m > 3 such that Sm 6` HCon(Snm), and the existence of a natrual n such
that
⋃
m Sm 6` HCon(Sn3 ), where HCon stands for Herbrand consistency.
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• Z. Adamowicz and K. Zdanowski have obtained some results on the unprovability of the relativized notion
of Herbrand consistency in theories containing I∆0 + Ω1; see [4]. Their paper contains some insightful ideas
about the notion of Herbrand consistency.
For I∆0 + Ω1 the arguments are rather smoother, in comparison to the case of I∆0. Our proof for the
main theorem on I∆0 + Ω1 borrows many ideas from [3], the major difference being the coding techniques
and making use of a more liberal definition of Herbrand consistency. The definition of HCon given in [2]
and [3] depends on a special coding given there. For reading the present paper no familiarity with [2] is
needed, but a theorem of [3] will be of critical use here (Theorem 22). We will even use a modified version
of it (Theorem 37). For I∆0 we will see that our definition of HCon is not best suited for this theory; and
we will actually tailor it for I∆0. A hint for the obstacles in tackling Herbrand consistency in I∆0 can be
found in Chapters 3 and 4 of [13].
In Section 2 we introduce the ingredients of Herbrand’s theorem from the scratch, and then explain
how they can be arithmetized by Go¨del coding. This sets the stage for Section 3 in which we formalize
the notion of Herbrand model and use it to prove our main theorem for I∆0 + Ω1. Finally in Section 4
we modify our definitions and theorems to fit the I∆0 case. After pinpointing the places where we have
made an essential use of Ω1, we do some tailoring for I∆0, and prove our main result for I∆0. We finish
the paper with some conclusions and some open questions.
2 Basic Definitions and Arithmetizations
This section introduces the notions of Herbrand provability and Herbran consistency, and a way of for-
malizing and arithmetizing these concepts. The first subsection can be read by any logician. The second
subsection gets more technical with Go¨del coding, for which some familiarity with [7] is presumed.
2.1 Herbrand Consistency
Skolemizing a formula is usually performed on prenex normal forms (see e.g. [6]), and since prenex
normalizing a formula is not necessarily done in a unique way, then one may get different Skolemized
forms of a formula. For example, the tautology F = ∀xφ(x) → ∀xφ(x) can be prenex normalized into
either ∀x∃y(φ(y) → φ(x)) or ∃y∀x(φ(y) → φ(x)). These two formulas can be Skolemized respectively as
φ(f(x))→ φ(x) and φ(c)→ φ(x), where f is a new unary function symbol, and c is a new constant symbol.
Here we briefly describe a way of Skolemizing a (not-necessarily prenex normal) formula which results in
a somehow unique (up to a variable renaming) formula.
A formula is in negation normal form when the implication symbol does not appear in it, and the
negation symbol appears in front of atomic formulas only. A formula can be (uniquely) negation normalized
by the following rewriting rules:
(A→ B) Z=⇒ (¬A ∨B) ¬¬A Z=⇒ A
¬(A ∨B) Z=⇒ (¬A ∧ ¬B) ¬(A ∧B) Z=⇒ (¬A ∨ ¬B)
¬∀xA(x) Z=⇒ ∃x¬A(x) ¬∃xA(x) Z=⇒ ∀x¬A(x)
A formula is called rectified if no variables appears both bound and free in it, and different quantifiers
refer to different variables. A formula is called rectified negation normal if it is both negation normalized
and rectified. Again, any formula can be rectified. Indeed, any given formula is equivalent to its rectified
negation normal form (RNNF) which can be obtained from the formula in a unique (up to a variable
renaming) way (see e.g. [5]).
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Now we introduce Skolem functions for existential formulas: for any (not necessarily RNNF) formula of
the form ∃xA(x), let f∃xA(x) be a new m−ary function symbol where m is the number of the free variables
of ∃xA(x). When m = 0 then f∃xA(x) will obviously be a new constant symbol (cf. [6]).
Definition 1 Let ϕ be an RNNF formula. Define ϕS by induction:
• ϕS = ϕ for atomic or negated-atomic ϕ;
• (ϕ ◦ ψ)S = ϕS ◦ ψS for ◦∈{∧,∨} and RNNF formulas ϕ, ψ;
• (∀xϕ)S = ∀xϕS;
• (∃xϕ)S = ϕS[f∃xϕ(x)(y)/x] where y are the free variables of ∃xϕ(x) and the formula ϕS[f∃xϕ(x)(y)/x]
results from the formula ϕS by replacing all the occurrences of the variable x with the term f∃xϕ(x)(y).
The Skolemized form of any (not necessarily RNNF) formula ψ is obtained in the following way: using
the above rewriting rules we negation normalize ψ and then rename the repetitive variables (if any) to
get a rectified negation normal form of ψ, say ϕ. Then we get ϕS by the above definition, and remove
all the (universal) quantifiers in it (together with the variables next to them). We denote thus resulted
Skolemized form of ψ by ψSk. ⊂⊃
Note that ψSk can be obtained from ψ in a unique (up to a variable renaming) way, and it is an open
(quantifier-less) formula. For the above example F , assuming that φ is atomic, we get
F S = (∃x¬φ(x) ∨ ∀xφ(x))S = ¬φ(c) ∨ ∀xφ(x),
and thus F Sk = ¬φ(c) ∨ φ(x) ≡ φ(c)→ φ(x).
Definition 2 An Skolem instance of the formula ψ is any formula resulted from substituting the free vari-
ables of ψSk with some terms. So, if x1, . . . , xn are the free variables of ψ
Sk (thus written as ψSk(x1, . . . , xn))
then an Skolem instance of ψ is ψSk[t1/x1, · · · , tn/xn] where t1, . . . , tn are terms (which could be constructed
from the Skolem functions symbols).
Skolemized form of a theory T is by defintion T Sk = {ϕSk | ϕ∈T}. ⊂⊃
We are now ready to state an important theorem discovered by Herbrand (probably by also Skolem
and Go¨del). This theorem has got some few names, and by now is a classical theorem in Mathematical
Logic. Here we state a version of the theorem which we will need in the paper. The proof is omitted,
though it is not too difficult to prove it directly (see e.g. [5]).
Theorem 3 (Herbrand) Any theory T is equiconsistent with its Skolemized theory T Sk. In other words,
T is consistent if and only if every finite set of Skolem instances of T is (propositionally) satisfiable. ⊂⊃
We will use the above theorem, which reduces the consistency of a first-order theory to the satisfiability
of a propositional theory, for the definition of Herbrand Consistency: a theory T is Herbrand consistent
when every finite set of Skolem instances of T is propositionally satisfiable. One other concept is needed
for formalizing Herbrand consistency of arithmetical theories: evaluation.
Convention 4 Throughout the paper we deal with closed (or ground) terms (i.e., terms with no variable)
and for simplicity we call them “term”. For this to make sense, we may assume that the language of the
theory under consideration has at least one constant symbol. ⊂⊃
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Definition 5 An evaluation is a function whose domain is the set of all atomic formulas constructed from
a given set of terms Λ and its range is the set {0, 1} such that
(i) p [t= t] = 1 for all t∈Λ; and for any terms t, s∈Λ,
(ii) if p [t=s] = 1 then p [ϕ(t)] = p [ϕ(s)] for any atomic formula ϕ(x).
The relation vp on Λ is defined by t vp s ⇐⇒ p[t = s] = 1 for t, s∈Λ. ⊂⊃
Lemma 6 The relation vp defined above is an equivalence relation.
Proof. For ϕ(x) ≡ (s= x) from p [t= s] = 1 one can infer p [s= t] = p [ϕ(t)] = p [ϕ(s)] = p [s= s] = 1.
So, t vp s implies s vp t. Also for φ(x) ≡ (t=x) the condition p [s= r] = 1 implies p [t= s] = p [φ(s)] =
p [φ(r)] = p [t=r]. So, vp is a symmetric and transitive (also, by definition, a reflexive) relation. bc
Notation 7 The vp−class of a term t is denoted by t/p; and the set of all such p−classes for each t∈Λ
is denoted by Λ/p.
For simplicity, we write p |= ϕ instead of p [ϕ] = 1; thus p 6|= ϕ stands for p [ϕ] = 0. This definition of
satisfying can be generalized to other open formulas in the usual way:
• p |= ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if p |= ϕ and p |= ψ;
• p |= ϕ ∨ ψ if and only if p |= ϕ or p |= ψ;
• p |= ¬ϕ if and only if p 6|= ϕ. ⊂⊃
Let us note that vp is a congruence relation as well. That is, for any set of terms ti and si (i = 1, . . . , n)
and function symobl f , if p |= t1 = s1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn = sn then p |= f(t1, . . . , tn) = f(s1, . . . , sn).
Definition 8 If all terms appearing in an Skolem instance of φ belong to the set Λ, that formula is called
an Skolem instance of φ available in Λ.
An evaluation defined on Λ is called a φ−evaluation if it satisfies all the Skolem instances of φ which are
available in Λ.
Similarly, for a theory T , a T−evaluation on Λ is an evaluation on Λ which satisfies every Skolem instance
of every formula of T which is available in Λ. ⊂⊃
For illustrating the above concepts we now present an example.
Example 9 Take the language L = {g, P,R, S} in which g is a binary function symbol, and P is a binary
predicate symbol, and R, S are unary predicate symbols. Let the theory T be axiomatized by:
T1 : ∀x∃yP (x, y);
T2 : ∀x
(
R(x) ∨ S(gx));
T3 : ∀x, y
(¬P (x, y) ∨ ¬S(x)).
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, denote f∃yP (x,y) by f; then the Skolemized form of the above theory is:
T Sk1 : P (x, fx); T
Sk
2 : R(x) ∨ S(gx); T Sk3 : ¬P (x, y) ∨ ¬S(x).
For a constant symbol c let Λ = {c, gc, fc}. Then P (c, fc) and R(c) ∨ S(gc) are Skolem instances of T (of
T1 and T2) available in Λ, but the Skolem instance R(gc) ∨ S(ggc) of T2 is not available in Λ. Let us note
also that the Skolem instance ¬P (gc, fgc) ∨ ¬S(gc) of T3 is not available in Λ.
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Let q be an evaluation on Λ whose set of true atomic formulas is {P (c, fc), R(c)}. Then q is a T−evaluation.
On the other hand the evaluation r on Λ whose set of true atomic formulas is {P (c, fc), R(c), S(c)}, is not
a T−evaluation, though it satisfies all the Skolem instances of T1 and T2 which are available in Λ. Note
that r does not satisfy the Skolem instance ¬P (c, fc) ∨ ¬S(c) of T3. ⊂⊃
By the above theorem of Herbrand, a theory T is consistent if and only if every finite set of its Skolem
instances is satisfiable, if and only if for every finite set of terms Λ there is a T−evaluation on Λ. And for a
formula ϕ, T ` ϕ if and only if there exists a finite set of terms Λ such that there is no (T+¬ϕ)−evaluation
on Λ. We call this notion of provability, Herbrand Provability; note that then Herbrand Consistency of a
theory T means the existence of a T−evaluation on any (finite) set of terms.
Example 10 In the previous example, let ϕ = ∀xR(x). We show T ` ϕ by Herbrand provability. Write
¬ϕ = ∃x¬R(x), and let c denote the Skolem constant symbol f∃x¬R(x); so we have (¬ϕ)Sk = ¬R(c). Put
Λ = {c, gc, fgc}, and assume (for the sake of contradiction) that there is a (T+¬ϕ)−evaluation p on Λ. Then
p must satisfy the following Skolem instances of T in Λ: P (gc, fgc), R(c)∨S(gc), and ¬P (gc, fgc)∨¬S(gc).
Whence p must also satisfy ¬S(gc) and R(c). So p cannot satisfy the Skolem instance ¬R(c) of ¬ϕ in Λ.
Thus there cannot be any (T + ¬ϕ)−evaluation on Λ; whence T ` ϕ.
Note that finding an appropriate Λ is as complicated as finding a formal proof. For example we could not
have taken Λ as {c, gc, fc}, since the evaluation q in the previous example would be a (T +¬ϕ)−evaluation
on that set. ⊂⊃
The following couple of examples give a thorough illustrations for the above ideas, and they will be
actually used later in the paper.
Example 11 Let Q denote Robinson’s Arithmetic over the language of arithmetic 〈0, s,+, ·,6〉, where 0
is a constant symbol, s is a unary function symbol, +, · are binary function symbols, and 6 is a binary
predicate symbol, whose axioms are:
A1 : ∀x(sx 6= 0) A2 : ∀x∀y(sx = sy → x = y)
A3 : ∀x(x 6= 0→ ∃y[x = sy]) A4 : ∀x∀y(x 6 y ↔ ∃z[x+ z = y])
A5 : ∀x(x+ 0 = x) A6 : ∀x∀y(x+ sy = s(x+ y))
A7 : ∀x(x · 0 = 0) A8 : ∀x∀y(x · sy = x · y + x)
Let ψ = ∀x(x 6 0 → x = 0) and ϕ = ∀x∀y(x 6 sy → x = sy ∨ x 6 y). We can show Q ` ψ and Q ` ϕ;
these will be proved below by Herbrand provability. Suppose Q has been Skolemized as below:
ASk1 : sx 6= 0 ASk2 : sx 6= sy ∨ x = y
ASk3 : x = 0 ∨ x = spx ASk4 : [x 6 y ∨ x+ h(x, y) = y] ∧ [x+ z 6= y ∨ x 6 y]
ASk5 : x+ 0 = x A
Sk
6 : x+ sy = s(x+ y)
ASk7 : x · 0 = 0 ASk8 : x · sy = x · y + x
Here p abbreviates f∃y(x=sy) and h stands for f∃z(x+z=y).
For a fixed term t, put Σt be the following set of terms:
Σt = {0, t, t+ 0, h(t, 0), ph(t, 0), sph(t, 0), t+ sph(t, 0), s(t+ sph(t, 0))},
and suppose that p is an Q−evaluation on Σt. We show that p |= t 6 0 ∨ t = 0. Note that Skolemizing
ψ results in ψSk = (x 6 0 ∨ x = 0). If p is such an evaluation and if p |= t 6 0, then by A4 we have
c© Saeed Salehi 2010 http://saeedsalehi.ir/ uΣα∂
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p |= t + h(t, 0) = 0. Now, either p |= h(t, 0) = 0 or p 6|= h(t, 0) = 0. In the former case, we have
p |= t+ 0 = t which by A5 implies p |= t = 0. In the latter case, by A3 we get p |= h(t, 0) = sph(t, 0), and
then p |= 0 = t+ h(t, 0) = t+ sph(t, 0) = s(t+ ph(t, 0)) by A6, which is a contradiction with A1. Thus we
showed that if p |= t 6 0 then necessarily p |= t = 0.
Now, for two fixed terms u, v define Γu,v as
Γu,v = {0, u, v, sv, h(u, sv), ph(u, sv), sph(u, sv), u+ ph(u, sv),
u+ sph(u, sv), s(u+ ph(u, sv))}.
We show that any Q−evaluation on Γu,v must satisfy u 6 sv ∨ u = sv ∨ u ≤ v. Note that the Skolemized
form of ϕ is ϕSk = (x 6 sy ∨ x = sy ∨ x 6 y). Suppose p is an Q−evaluation on Γu,v. Then either
p |= h(u, sv) = 0 or p |= h(u, sv) 6= 0. In the former case, by A4, we have p |= u 6 sv∨u+0 = sv, and then
by A5, p |= u 6 sv ∨ u = sv. And in the latter case p |= h(u, sv) = sph(u, sv) by A3, also by A4 we have
p |= u 6 sv∨u+ sph(u, sv) = sv. On the other hand from A5 we get p |= u+ sph(u, sv) = s(u+ph(u, sv)).
Whence we get p |= u 6 sv ∨ s(u+ ph(u, sv)) = sv, then by A2, p |= u 6 sv ∨ u+ ph(u, sv) = v, which by
A4 implies p |= u 6 sv ∨ u 6 v. Hence, in both cases we showed p |= u 6 sv ∨ u = sv ∨ u 6 v. Finally, let
us note that one could present a Herbrand proof of Q ` ψ and Q ` ϕ very similarly. ⊂⊃
Example 12 In the language of Example 11, 〈0, s,+, ·,6〉, let indψ be the following induction scheme for
the formula ψ(x):
ψ(0) ∧ ∀x(ψ(x)→ ψ(sx))→ ∀xψ(x).
Assume for the moment that ψ is an atomic formula. Then the Skolemization of indψ results in ind
Sk
ψ :
¬ψ(0) ∨
(
ψ(c) ∧ ¬ψ(sc)
)
∨ ψ(x), where c is the Skolem constant symbol f∃x(ψ(x)∧¬ψ(sx)). Then any
indψ−evaluation p on the set of terms {0, c, sc, t} must satisfy one of the following:
either (1) p 6|= ψ(0) or (2) p |= ψ(c) ∧ ¬ψ(sc) or (3) p |= ψ(t).
Now take ψ(x) to be the existential formula ∃yϕ(x, y) in which ϕ is an atomic formula. Then the Skolemized
form of indψ will be as
indSkψ : ¬ϕ(0, u) ∨
(
ϕ(c, qc) ∧ ¬ϕ(sc, v)
)
∨ ϕ(x, q(x)),
where q is the Skolem function symbol for the formula ∃yϕ(x, y), and c is the Skolem constant symbol for
the sentence ∃x(∃wϕ(x,w) ∧ ∀v¬ϕ(sx, v)). The variables u, v and x are free.
We will need the case of ϕ(x, y) =
(
y 6 x · x ∧ y = x · x) in the proof of Theorem 38 below. In this case
the Skolemized form of indψ is
(u 6 02 ∨ u 6= 02)
∨
((
qc 6 c2 ∧ qc = c2) ∧ (v 6 (sc)2 ∨ v 6= (sc)2))∨(
q(x) 6 x2 ∧ q(x) = x2).
The notation %2 is a shorthand for % · %. Define the set of terms Υ by
Υ = {0, 0 + 0, 02, c, c2, c2 + 0, sc, qc, (sc)2, (sc)2 + 0}
and suppose p is an (Q + indψ)−evaluation on the set of terms Υ ∪ {t, t2, q(t)}. Then p must satisfy the
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following Skolem instance (ð) of indψ which is available in the set Υ ∪ {t, t2, q(t)}:
(0 6 02 ∨ 0 6= 02)
∨
((
qc 6 c2 ∧ qc = c2) ∧ ((sc)2 6 (sc)2 ∨ (sc)2 6= (sc)2))∨(
q(t) 6 t2 ∧ q(t) = t2).
Now since p |= 0 · 0 = 0 + 0 = 0 then, by Q’s axioms, p |= 0 6 02 ∧ 0 = 02, and so p cannot satisfy the
first disjunct of (ð). Similarly, since p |= (sc)2 + 0 = (sc)2 then p |= (sc)2 6 (sc)2, thus p cannot satisfy the
second disjunct of (ð) either, because p |= (sc)2 = (sc)2. Whence, p must satisfy the third disjucnt of (ð),
then necessarily p |= q(t) = t2 must hold. ⊂⊃
In Example 11 we used the axioms of Robinson’s Arithmetic Q to derive two sentences that will be needed
later (see Lemma 25). In Example 12 we used an axiom of I∆0 to derive the existence of an squaring
Skolem function symbol (see the proof of Theorem 38)
Remark 13 The arguments of the above two examples can be generalized as follows: if T ` ∀xθ(x) where
θ is an open (quantifier-less) RNNF formula, then (¬∀xθ(x))Sk = ¬θ(c) in which c is a sequence of Skolem
constant symbols. There exists a set of terms Γ (constructed from the Skolem function and constant
symbols of T with c) such that there exists no (T + ¬∀xθ(x))−evluation on Γ. So, for any sequnece of
terms t, if Γ(t) is the set of terms which result from the terms of Γ by substituting c with t, then any
T−evaluation on Γ(t) must satisfy the formula θ(t). ⊂⊃
2.2 Arithmetization
Fix LA to be our language of arithmetic; one can set LA = 〈0, 1,+, ·, <〉 as e.g. in [9] or LA = 〈0, s,+, ·,6〉
as e.g. in [7]. Later it will be clear that choosing this fixed language is not of much importance.
Peano’s arithmetic PA is the first-order theory that extends Q (see Example 11) by the following
induction schema for any arithmetical formula ϕ(x): ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1))→ ∀xϕ(x). Fragments
of PA are extensions of Q with the induction schema restricted to a class of formulas. A formula is called
bounded if its every quantifier is bounded, i.e., is either of the form ∀x6 t(. . .) or ∃x6 t(. . .) where t is
a term; they are read as ∀x(x6 t → . . .) and ∃x(x6 t ∧ . . .) respectively. It is easy to see that bounded
formulas are decidable. The theory I∆0, also called bounded arithmetic, is axiomatized by Q plus the
induction schema for bounded formulas. The exponentiation function exp is defined by exp(x) = 2x; the
formula Exp expresses its totality: (∀x∃y[y = exp(x)]). The converse of exp is denoted by log which is
formally defined as log x = min{y | x 6 exp(y)}; and the cut o`g consists of the logarithms of all elements:
o`g = {x | ∃y[exp(x) = y]}. The superscripts above the function symbols indicate the iteration of the
functions: exp2(x) = exp(exp(x)), log2 x = log log x; similarly the cut o`gn is {x | ∃y[expn(x) = y]}. Let us
recall that Exp is not provable in I∆0; and sub-theories of I∆0 + Exp are called weak arithmetics. Between
I∆0 and I∆0 + Exp a hierarchy of theories is considered in the literature, which has close connections with
computational complexity. Define the function ωm to be ωm(x) = exp
m
(
(logm x)·(logm x)). It is customary
to define this function by induction: ω0(x) = x
2 and ωn+1(x) = exp(ωn(log x)). Let Ωm express the totality
of ωm (i.e., Ωm ≡ ∀x∃y[y = ωm(x)]).
By Go¨del’s coding method, we are now rest assured that the concepts introduced in the pervious
section all can be formalized (and arithmetized) in the language of arithmetic. But we need just a bit
more; and that is an “effective” coding, suitable for bounded arithmetic. The one we adopt here is taken
from Chapter V of [7]. For convenience, and shortening the computations, we introduce the P notation.
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Definition 14 We say x is of P(y), when the code of x is bounded above by a polynomial of y; and we
write this as pxq 6 P(y), meaning that for some n the inequality pxq 6 yn + n holds. ⊂⊃
Let us note that X 6 P(Y ) is equivalent to the old (more familiar) O−notation “ logX ∈O(log Y )”.
Here we collect some very basic facts about this fixed efficient coding that will be needed later.
Remark 15 Let A be a set or a sequence of terms, and let |A| denote the cardinality of A, when A is a
set, and the same |A| denote the length of A, when A is a sequence. Then
• p〈α〉q 6 9(pαq+ 1)2 (Lemma 3.7.2 page 297 of [7]);
• pA_Bq (pA ∪Bq) 6 64 · (pAq · pBq) (Proposition 3.29 page 311 of [7]);
• (|A|) 6 (log pAq) (Definition 3.27 and Section (e) pages 304–310 of [7]);
where pA_Bq is the concatenation of (the sequences) A and B. ⊂⊃
If we let LSkA to be the closure of LA under Skolem function and constant symbols, i.e., let LSkA be
the smallest set that contains LA and for any LSkA −formula ∃xφ(x) we have f∃xφ(x) ∈ LSkA , then this
new countable language can also be re-coded, and this recoding can be generalized to LSkA −terms and
LSkA −formulas. We wish to compute an upper bound for the codes of evaluations on a set of terms Λ. For
a given Λ, all the atomic formulas, in the language LA, constructed from terms of Λ are either of the form
t = s or of the form t 6 s for some t, s∈Λ. And every member of an evaluation p on Λ is an ordered pair
like 〈t = s, i〉 or 〈t 6 s, i〉 for some t, s∈Λ and i∈{0, 1}. Thus the code of any member of p is a constant
multiple of (ptq · psq)2, and so the code of p is bounded above by P(∏t,s∈Λptq · psq).
Lemma 16 For a set of terms Λ and evaluation p on it, ppq 6 P (ω1(pΛq)).
Proof. It suffices, by the above remark and what was said afterward, to note that
∏
t,s∈Λptq · psq =∏
t∈Λ(ptq)2|Λ| = (
∏
t∈Λptq)2|Λ| 6 P(pΛq)2 logpΛq 6 P(pΛqlogpΛq) and that pΛqlogpΛq 6 ω1(pΛq). bc
Let us have another look at the above lemma, which is of great importance. For a set of terms Λ, there
are |Λ| terms in it (the cardinality of Λ). So, there are 2|Λ|2 atomic formulas constructed from the terms
of Λ (atomic formulas of the form t = s or t 6 s for t, s ∈ Λ). And thus, there are exp(2|Λ|2) different
evaluations on the set Λ. And finally note that by |Λ| 6 (logpΛq) we get exp(2|Λ|2) 6 P (exp((logpΛq)2)) 6
P (ω1(pΛq)). So, in the presence of ω1(pΛq) we have all the evaluations on Λ in our disposal.
All these concepts can be expressed in the language of arithmetic LA by appropriate formulas. And
“Herbrand Consistency of the theory T” can be arithmetized as “for every set of terms there exists an
T−evaluation on it”. Let HCon(T ) denote the LA−formula “T is Herbrand consistent”.
3 Herbrand Models
For a theory T , when Λ is the set of all terms (constructed from the function symbols of the language of
T and also the Skolem function symbols of the formulas of T ) any T−evaluation on Λ induces a model
of T , which is called a Herbrand model. Here we use this notion for building up a definable inner model,
which will constitute the hear of the proof of our main result for I∆0 + Ω1.
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3.1 Arithmetically Definable Herbrand Models
In the sequel, we arithmetize Herbrand models.
Definition 17 Let L be a language and Λ be a set of (ground) terms (constructed by the Skolem constant
and function symbols of L).
Put Λ〈0〉 = Λ, and define inductively
Λ〈k+1〉 = Λ〈k〉 ∪ {f(t1, . . . , tm) | f ∈L & t1, . . . , tm∈Λ〈k〉}
∪ {f∃xψ(x)(t1, . . . , tm) | pψq 6 k & t1, . . . , tm∈Λ〈k〉}.
Let Λ〈∞〉 denote the union
⋃
k∈N Λ
〈k〉.
Suppose p is an evaluation on Λ〈∞〉. Define M(Λ, p) = {t/p | t∈Λ〈∞〉} and put the L−structure on it by
• fM(Λ,p)(t1/p, . . . , tm/p) = f(t1, . . . , tm)/p, and
• RM(Λ,p) = {(t1/p, . . . , tm/p) | p |= R(t1, . . . , tm)};
for f,R∈L and t1, . . . , tm∈Λ〈∞〉. ⊂⊃
Lemma 18 The definition of L−structure on M(Λ, p) is well-defined, and when p is an T−evaluation on
Λ〈∞〉, for an L−theory T , then M(Λ, p) |= T .
Proof. That the definitions of fM(Λ,p) and RM(Λ,p) are well-defined follows directly from the definition
of an evaluation (Definition 5). By the definition of Λ〈∞〉 the structure M(Λ, p) is closed under all the
Skolem functions of L, and moreover it satisfies an atomic (or negated atomic) formula A(t1/p, . . . , tm/p)
if and only if p |= A(t1, . . . , tm). Then it can be shown, by induction on the complexity of formulas, that
for every RNNF formula ψ, we have M(Λ, p) |= ψ whenever p satisfies all the available Skolem instances
of ψ in Λ〈∞〉. bc
We need an upper bound on the size (cardinal) and the code of Λ〈j〉.
Lemma 19 The following inequalities hold when pΛq and |Λ| are sufficiently larger than n:
(1) |Λ〈n〉| 6 P (|Λ|n!), and
(2) pΛ〈n〉q 6 P
((
pΛq
)|Λ|(n+1)!)
.
Proof. Denote pΛ〈k〉q by λk (thus pΛq = λ0 = λ) and |Λ〈k〉| by σk (and thus |Λ| = σ0 = σ). We first note
that σk+1 6 σk +MσMk + kσkk for a fixed M . Thus σk+1 6 P(σk+1k ), and then, by an inductive argument,
we have σn 6 P(σn!). For the second statement, we first compute an upper bound for the code of the
Cartesian power Am for a set A. By an argument similar to that of the proof of Lemma 16, we have
pAk+1q 6 P(∏t∈Ak&s∈Aptq · psq) 6 P(pAkq|A| · pAq|A|k), and thus pAmq 6 P(pAq|A|m) can be shown by
induction on m. Now we have λk+1 6 P
(
pΛ〈k〉q · p(Λ〈k〉)Mq · p(Λ〈k〉)kq) for a fixed M . So, λk+1 6 P(λσkkk )
and finally our desired conclusion λm 6 P
(
λσ
(m+1)!)
follows by induction. bc
Stating the above fact as a lemma, despite of the fact that it is indeed a crucial tool for our arguments,
let us state the following corollary of it as a theorem, and later on we will use the theorem and will leave
the lemma right here.
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Theorem 20 If for a set of terms Λ with non-standard pΛq the value ω2(pΛq) exists, then for a non-
standard j the value pΛ〈j〉q will exist.
Proof. There must exist a non-standard j such that j 6 log4(pΛq). Thus 2(j+1)! 6 22j 6 log2pΛq. Now,
by Lemma 19 we can write pΛ〈j〉q 6 P
(
(pΛq)|Λ|(j+1)!
)
6 P
(
(22 logpΛq)(logpΛq)
(j+1)!
)
6
P (exp((logpΛq)2(j+1)!)) 6 P (exp(ω1(logpΛq))), or in other words pΛ〈j〉q 6 P (ω2(pΛq)). bc
The reason that Theorem 20 is stated for non-standard Λ is that the set Λ〈∞〉, needed for constructing
the model M(Λ, p), is not definable in LA. But the existence of the definable Λ〈j〉 for a non-standard j can
guarantee the existence of Λ〈∞〉 and thus of M(Λ, p). This non-standard j exists for non-standard pΛq.
3.2 The Main Theorem for I∆0 + Ω1
Two interesting theorems were proved by Z. Adamowicz in [3] about Herbrand Consistency of the theories
I∆0 + Ωm for m > 2:
Theorem 21 (Z. Adamowicz [3]) For a bounded formula θ(x) and m > 2, if the theory (I∆0 + Ωm) +
∃x∈ o`gm+1θ(x) + HCon o`gm−2(I∆0 + Ωm) is consistent, then so is the theory (I∆0 + Ωm) + ∃x∈ o`gm+2θ(x),
where HCon o`gm−2 is the relativization of HCon to the cut o`g
m−2. ⊂⊃
Theorem 22 (Z. Adamowicz [3]) For any natural m,n > 0 there exists a bounded formula η(x) such
that (I∆0 + Ωm) + ∃x∈ o`gnη(x) is consistent, but (I∆0 + Ωm) + ∃x∈ o`gn+1η(x) is not consistent. ⊂⊃
These two theorems (by putting n = m+ 1 for m > 2) imply together that for any m > 2 :
I∆0 + Ωm 6` HCon o`gm−2(I∆0 + Ωm).
Here we extend Theorem 21 for I∆0 + Ω1, namely we show that
Theorem 23 For any bounded formula θ(x), the consistency of the theory (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g2θ(x) +
HCon(I∆0 + Ω1) implies the consistency of the theory (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g3θ(x).
The rest of this section is devoted to proving this theorem. Let us note that Theorem 22 holds already
for I∆0 + Ω1, and below we reiterate the part that we need here:
Theorem 24 (Z. Adamowicz [3]) There exists a bounded formula η(x) such that the arithmetical theory
(I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g2η(x) is consistent, but (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g3η(x) is not consistent. ⊂⊃
Having proved the main theorem (23), we can immediately infer that
I∆0 + Ω1 6` HCon(I∆0 + Ω1).
As the proof of Theorem 23 is long, we will break it into a few lemmas. First we note that α∈ o`g3 if and
only if there exists a sequence 〈w0, w1, · · · , wα〉 of length (α+ 1) such that w0 = exp3(0) = 22, and for any
j < α, wj+1 = ω1(wj). Noting that ω1(exp
3(j)) = exp3(j + 1) one can then see that wα = exp
3(α), and so
α∈ o`g3. This can be formalized in I∆0 + Ω1 by an arithmetical formula. Note that the code of the above
sequence is bounded by P(∏j=αj=0 wj) 6 P( exp(∑j=αj=0 exp2(j))) 6 P (exp3(α + 1)) 6 P (ω1(exp3(α))). So,
in the presence of Ω1, the existence of exp
3(α) guarantees the existence of the above sequence of wj’s.
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For proving Theorem 23 let us assume that we have a model
M |= (I∆0 + Ω1) +
(
α∈ o`g2 ∧ θ(α))+ HCon(I∆0 + Ω1),
for some bounded formula θ(x) and some non-standard α∈M, and then we construct a model
N |= (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g3θ(x).
If our language of arithmetic LA contains the successor function s, then define the terms j’s by in-
duction: 0 = 0, and j + 1 = s(j). If LA does not contain s, then it should have the constant 1, and in
this case we can put j + 1 = j + 1. The term j represents the (standard or non-standard) number j.
For the sake of simplicity, assume w denotes the Skolem function symbol f∃y(y=ω1(x)). Put w0 = 4 and
inductively wj+1 = w(wj). Then wk, in the theory I∆0 + Ω1, is the term which represents exp
3(k). Finally,
put Λ = {0, . . . , ω1(α),w0, . . . ,wα} = {j | j 6 ω1(α)} ∪ {wj | j 6 α}. We can now estimate an upper
bound for the code of Λ: pΛq 6 P
(∏j=ω1(α)
j=1 2
j
)
6 P (exp(ω1(α)2)).
So Λ has a code in M (since M |= α ∈ o`g2), and moreover ω2(pΛq) exists in M, because ω2(pΛq) 6
P (ω2(exp(ω1(α)2))) 6 P (exp(ω1(ω1(α)2))) 6 P (exp2 (4(logα)4)) 6 P (exp2(α)).
Thus by Theorem 20 there exists a non-standard j such that Λ〈j〉 has a code inM. Since by the assumption
above we haveM |= HCon(I∆0 + Ω1), then there exists an (I∆0 + Ω1)−evaluation p on Λ〈j〉 (inM). Now,
by what was said after the proof of Theorem 20 one can construct the model M(Λ, p) = N . By Lemma 18
we have N |= (I∆0 + Ω1), and also N |= α/p∈ o`g3 follows from the existence of wj/p’s. It remains (only)
to show that M(Λ, p) |= θ(α/p).
For this purpose we prove the following lemmas where we assume that M is as above and there are
some non-standard set of terms and evaluation Λ, p inM such that Λ ⊇ {0, . . . , ω1(α)} for a non-standard
α∈M, and p is an I∆0−evaluation on Λ〈∞〉.
Lemma 25 If M(Λ, p) |= t/p 6 i/p holds for a term t and i 6 ω1(α) in M, then M(Λ, p) |= t/p = j/p
for some j 6 i.
Proof. By the assumption M |= “p |= t 6 i”. We prove by induction on i that there exists some j 6 i in
M such that M |= “p |= t = j”.
• For i = 0 by Example 11 the assumption M |= “p |= t 6 0” implies M |= “p |= t = 0”, noting that
p is an Q−evaluation on Λ〈∞〉, and thus all the needed Skolem terms are in p’s disposal.
• For i + 1 we have M |= “p |= t 6 i∨ t = s(i)” by Example 11 and the assumed satisfaction
M |= “p |= t 6 s(i)”. Then ifM |= “p |= t = s(i)” we are done, and ifM |= “p |= t 6 i” by the induction
hypothesis there must exist some j 6 i in M such that M |= “p |= t = j”. bc
Remark 26 The proof of the above lemma does not depend on the axioms of Q (and I∆0). Indeed, in
some axiomatization of Q in the literature, the sentences
ψ = ∀x(x 6 0→ x = 0) and ϕ = ∀x∀y(x 6 sy → x = sy ∨ x 6 y) (see Example 11)
are accepted as axioms. In our axiomatization, the above sentences were derivable theorems. In some
axiomatizations of Q our axiom A4 is replaced with A
′
4 : ∀x, y(x 6 y ↔ ∃z[z+ x = y]); note the difference
of x + z in A4 and z + x in A
′
4 (see e.g. [7]). In this new axiomatization the sentence ϕ is not derivable.
However, since we have I∆0 ` ψ ∧ ϕ, then by the argument of Remark 13, the above Lemma 25 can be
proved by using the fact that p is an I∆0−evaluation on Λ〈∞〉. ⊂⊃
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Lemma 27 For any LA−term t(x1, . . . , xm) and i1, . . . , im 6 ω1(α), if M |= x 6 t(i1, . . . , im) for some
x, then for an LA−term t′(x1, . . . , xk) and some j1, . . . , jk 6 ω1(α) we have M |= x = t′(j1, . . . , jk).
Proof. By induction on (the complexity of) the term t.
• For t = 0 and t = x1 the proof is straightforward.
• For t = su the assumption M |= x 6 su(i1, . . . , im) implies that either M |= x = su(i1, . . . , im) or
M |= x 6 u(i1, . . . , im) is true, and then the conclusion follows from the induction hypothesis.
• For t = u+v, and the assumptionM |= x 6 u(i1, . . . , im)+v(i1, . . . , im), we consider two cases. First
ifM |= x 6 u(i1, . . . , im) then we are done by the induction hypothesis. Second ifM |= u(i1, . . . , im) 6 x
then there exists a y such thatM |= x = u(i1, . . . , im) + y and moreoverM |= y 6 v(i1, . . . , im). Now, by
the induction hypothesis there are a term t′(x1, . . . , xk) and some elements j1, . . . , jk 6 ω1(α) such that
M |= y = t′(j1, . . . , jk). Whence we finally get the conclusion M |= x = u(i1, . . . , im) + t′(j1, . . . , jk).
• For t = u ·v, by an argument similar to that of the previous case, we can assumeM |= u(i1, . . . , im) 6
x 6 u(i1, . . . , im) · v(i1, . . . , im). There are some q, r such that M |= x = u(i1, . . . , im) · q + r and
M |= r 6 u(i1, . . . , im). We also have M |= q 6 v(i1, . . . , im). By the induction hypothesis there are
terms t′, t′′ and j1, . . . , jk 6 ω1(α) such that M |= q = t′(j1, . . . , jk)
∧
r = t′′(j1, . . . , jk). Thus we finally
have M |= x = u(i1, . . . , im) · t′(j1, . . . , jk) + t′′(j1, . . . , jk). bc
Lemma 28 For i, j, k 6 ω1(α) in M we have
(1) if i 6 j 6 ω1(α) then M(Λ, p) |= i/p 6 j/p ;
(2) if i+ j 6 ω1(α) then M(Λ, p) |= i/p+ j/p = i+ j/p ;
(3) if i · j 6 ω1(α) then M(Λ, p) |= i/p · j/p = i · j/p .
Proof. We need to show for the i, j 6 ω1(α) that
(1) if M |= i 6 j then M |= “p |= i 6 j”,
(2) if M |= i+ j 6 ω1(α) then M |= “p |= i+ j = i+ j”, and
(3) if M |= i · j 6 ω1(α) then M |= “p |= i · j = i · j”.
First we note that the statement (2) above implies already (1), since if we haveM |= i 6 j, then for some
k we should have M |= i + k = j, and then by (2), M |= “p |= i + k = j” which implies (by A4 of Q -
see Example 11) thatM |= “p |= i 6 j”. By induction on j, very similarly to the proof of Lemma 25, one
can prove the statements (2) and (3), noting that the evaluation p must satisfy the following axioms of Q:
A5 : ∀x(x+ 0 = x); A6 : ∀x∀y(x+ sy = s(x+ y));
A7 : ∀x(x · 0 = 0); A8 : ∀x∀y(x · sy = x · y + x).
bc
Corollary 29 Suppose for an LA−term t(x1, . . . , xm) and some elements i1, . . . , im, i 6 ω1(α), we have
M |= t(i1, . . . , im) = i. Then we must also have M(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) = i/p.
Proof. By induction on t using Lemma 28. bc
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Lemma 30 Suppose t(x1, . . . , xm), t
′(x1, . . . , xm) are two LA−terms and i1, . . . , im 6 αk are elements of
M for some standard number k ∈ N. Then, if M |= t(i1, . . . , im) = t′(i1, . . . , im) holds, M(Λ, p) |=
t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) = t
′(i1/p, . . . , im/p) must hold too.
Proof. By i1, . . . , im 6 αk we have t(i1, . . . , im) 6 ω1(α). Put i be the common value i = t(i1, . . . , im) =
t′(i1, . . . , im). Then By Corollary 29 we have M(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) = i/p = t′(i1/p, . . . , im/p). bc
Lemma 31 Suppose t(x1, . . . , xm), t
′(x1, . . . , xm) are two LA−terms and i1, . . . , im 6 αk are elements of
M for some standard number k∈N. If we have M |= t(i1, . . . , im) 6 t′(i1, . . . , im) then we must also have
the satisfaction M(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) 6 t′(i1/p, . . . , im/p).
Proof. Noting that Q ` ∀x, y(x 6 y ↔ ∃z(x + z = y)) by the assumption there exists an β∈M such
that M |= t(i1, . . . , im) + β = t′(i1, . . . , im). On the other hand M |= β 6 t′(i1, . . . , im), so by Lemma 27
there exist a term u and some j1, . . . , jk 6 ω1(α) such that M |= β = u(j1, . . . , jk). Thus the equality
t(i1, . . . , im) + u(j1, . . . , jk) = s(i1, . . . , im) holds in M. Now, by Lemma 30,
M(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) + u(j1/p, . . . , jk/p) = t′(i1/p, . . . , im/p),
whence t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) 6 t′(i1/p, . . . , im/p) is satisfied in M(Λ, p). bc
Lemma 32 Suppose t(x1, . . . , xm), t
′(x1, . . . , xm) are two LA−terms and i1, . . . , im 6 αk are elements of
M for some standard number k∈N. If it is true that M |= t(i1, . . . , im) 6= t′(i1, . . . , im) then M(Λ, p) |=
t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) 6= t′(i1/p, . . . , im/p) must be true too. And if M |= t(i1, . . . , im) 6 t′(i1, . . . , im) then
M(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) 6 t′(i1/p, . . . , im/p).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 31 (and Remark 13) noting that p is an I∆0−evaluation on Λ〈∞〉 and
I∆0 ` ∀x, y
(
x 6= y ←→ sy 6 x ∨ sx 6 y), and
I∆0 ` ∀x, y
(
x  y ←→ sy 6 x). bc
Theorem 33 Suppose ψ(x1, . . . , xm) is an open RNNF LA−formula and i1, . . . , im 6 αk are elements
of M for some standard number k ∈ N. If we have M |= ψ(i1, . . . , im) then we also have M(Λ, p) |=
ψ(i1/p, . . . , im/p).
Proof. Lemmas 30 and 31 prove the theorem for atomic formulas, and Lemma 32 proves it for negated
atomic formulas. For the disjunctive and conjunctive compositions of those formulas one can prove the
theorem by a simple induction. bc
Theorem 34 Suppose that ϕ(x1, . . . , xm) is a bounded LA−formula and that i1, . . . , im 6 αk are elements
of M for some standard number k∈N. If M |= ϕ(i1, . . . , im) then M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(i1/p, . . . , im/p).
Proof. Every bounded formula can be written as an (equivalent) RNNF formula. By Lemma 27 the range
of bounded quantifiers of a formula whose all parameters belong to the set
{t(i1, . . . , im) | i1, . . . , im 6 α & t is an LA − term}
is indeed that set again. Now the conclusion follows from Theorem 33.
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I An alternative proof: To make this important theorem more clear, we sketch another proof, which is
not really too different but has more model-theoretic flavor. Consider the above set again
〈[0, α]〉M = {t(i1, . . . , im) | i1, . . . , im 6 α & t is an LA − term}
which is a subset ofM closed under the successor, addition, and multiplication, and thus forms a submodel
of M (generated by [0, α] = {x∈M | x 6 α}). This submodel is an initial segment of M by Lemma 27.
Hence, whenever M |= ϕ, for a bounded formula ϕ with parameters in [0, α], then 〈[0, α]〉M |= ϕ.
Now, similarly, the set
〈[0/p, α/p]〉N = {t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) | i1, . . . , im 6 α & t is an LA − term}
is an initial segment and a submodel of N = M(Λ, p). Thus if 〈[0/p, α/p]〉N |= ϕ, where ϕ is a
bounded formula with parameters in [0/p, α/p], then M(Λ, p) |= ϕ. Finally, we note that the map-
ping t(i1, . . . , im) 7→ t(i1/p, . . . , im/p) defines a bijection between 〈[0, α]〉M and 〈[0/p, α/p]〉N which is also
an isomorphism by Lemmas 30, 31 and 32. So the proof of the theorem goes as follows:
If M |= ϕ(i1, . . . , im) then 〈[0, α]〉M |= ϕ(i1, . . . , im), so 〈[0/p, α/p]〉N |= ϕ(i1/p, . . . , im/p) hence
M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(i1/p, . . . , im/p). bc
Corollary 35 By the above assumptions, M(Λ, p) |= θ(α/p). ⊂⊃
Let us summarize what was argued in the last few pages.
Proof. (Of Theorem 23.) By the assumption of the theorem, the theory (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g2θ(x) +
HCon(I∆0 + Ω1) is consistent. So there is a model
M |= (I∆0 + Ω1) +
(
α∈ o`g2 ∧ θ(α))+ HCon(I∆0 + Ω1),
where α ∈M. We wish to show the consistency of (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x ∈ o`g3θ(x) by constructing another
model
N |= (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g3θ(x).
If α is standard (i.e., α∈N) then one can take N =M. But if α∈M is non-standard, then we proceed as
follows: Take Λ to be the following set of terms: Λ = {j | j 6 ω1(α)}∪{wj | j 6 α} in which the terms j’s
and wj’s are defined inductively as 0 = 0, j + 1 = sj; and w0 = 4, wj+1 = w(wj). Here s is the successor
function, and w denotes the Skolem function symbol f∃y(y=ω1(x)). Now ω2(pΛq) is of order (far less than)
22
α
which exists by the assumption M |= α∈ o`g2. Then by Theorem 20 for a non-standard j the set of
terms Λ〈j〉 has a code in M. Thus the assumption M |= HCon(I∆0 + Ω1) implies that there must exists
an (I∆0 + Ω1)−evaluation p on Λ〈j〉. Then one can form the model N = M(Λ, p). Now N |= I∆0 + Ω1
by Lemma 18, and also N |= α/p∈ o`g3 by the definition of wα. Finally, N |= θ(α/p) by Corollary 35 (of
Theorem 34). Whence N is a model of the theory (I∆0 + Ω1) + ∃x∈ o`g3θ(x); and this finishes the proof
of its consistency. bc
4 Herbrand Consistency of I∆0
Our definition of Herbrand consistency is not best suited for I∆0: there are ω1(pΛq)−many evaluations
on a given set of terms Λ. Though this may not seem a big problem in the first glance (one can change
or modify the definition accordingly) but special care is needed for generalizing the results to the case of
I∆0. In the first subsection we pinpoint the critical usages of Ω1 and in the second subsection we tailor
the definitions and theorems in a way that we can prove our main theorem for I∆0 finally.
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4.1 Essentiality of Ω1
We made an essential use of Ω1 in the following parts of our arguments:
1- The totality of the ω1 function was needed for the upper bound of the code of an evaluation on a
given set of terms Λ. Namely, the code of any evaluation on Λ is of order ω1(pΛq), see Lemma 16. And
indeed there is no escape from this bound since, as it was explained after Lemma 16, there are exp(2|Λ|2)
evaluations on Λ, and if |Λ| ≈ logpΛq then there could exist as many as ω1(pΛq)2 evaluations on Λ. So,
if Ω1 is not available, then there could be a large and non-standard set of terms Γ in a model M such
that M cannot see all the evaluations on Γ. One of those evaluations could be a T−evaluation, that an
end-extension of M, say K, can see. Then Γ is a Herbrand proof of contradiction in M because in M’s
view there is no T−evaluation on Γ. But there could be indeed a very large T−evaluation on Γ whichM
could not see, but K can. Thus the definition of HCon is deficient for I∆0 (where Ω1 is not there) and
one cannot consider all the set of terms; those for which the ω1 of their codes exist, should be considered
instead.
2- The second critical use of Ω1 was in the definition of wj’s for shrinking the (double-)logarithmic
witness M |= α ∈ o`g2 to N |= wα/p ∈ o`g3. There we constructed the sequence 〈w0, . . . ,wα〉 of terms
such that w0 = 4 and wj+1 = w(wj) where w is the Skolem function symbol f∃y[y=ω1(x)]. And this was
in our disposal because Ω1 = ∀x∃y[y = ω1(x)] was one of the axioms (of I∆0 + Ω1) and thus every
(I∆0 + Ω1)−evluation must have satisfied w(t) = ω1(t).
Note that we also required Λ to contain {j | j 6 ω1(α)}, but for this we did not need the existence of
ω1(α); it was guaranteed by the assumption M |= α∈ o`g2.
4.2 Tailoring for I∆0
Here we introduce the necessary modifications on the above two points.
4.2.1 The Definition of HCon∗
The first point can be dealt with by tailoring the definition of HCon for I∆0:
Definition 36 A theory T is called Herbrand Consistent∗, denoted symbolically as HCon∗(T ), when for
all set of terms Λ, if ω1(pΛq) exists then there is an T−evaluation on Λ. ⊂⊃
This, obviously, can again be formalized in the language of arithmetic. The new definition cannot harm
our arguments too much, because we needed HCon only for some special set of terms. And it was Λ〈j〉
for a non-standard j where Λ = {j | j 6 ω1(α)} ∪ {wj | j 6 α}. For constructing the model M(Λ, p) we
already needed the existence of ω2(pΛq) (see the beginning of the proof of Theorem 23 before Lemma 25).
Thus if we require the existence of ω1(pΛq) in the definition of HCon∗, then we will need the existence of
ω2(pΛq) later in the proof! Thus the first deficiency can be overcome.
4.2.2 The Cuts I and J
In the absence of Ω1 we cannot define the above sequence 〈w0, . . . ,wα〉 satisfying wj+1 = ω1(wj). The
most we can do inside I∆0 is to define a sequence like 〈v0, . . . , vβ〉 where v0 = m and vj+1 = (vj)n for some
fixed m,n∈N. Then vβ = an2β 6 P(exp2(β)). Thus we cannot get anything larger than exp2, and so for
shortening a witness we should start from o`g and remain in the realm of o`g2. Indeed by the arguments
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of the beginning of the proof of Theorem 23 before Lemma 25 we did not need the existence of exp2(α)
for the existence of ω2(pΛq). We needed only exp2
(
4(logα)4
)
. Thus it seems natural to consider the cut
I = {x | ∃y[y = exp2 (4(logα)4)]} and its logarithm J = {x | ∃y[y = exp2 (4α4)]}. We first note that
Adamowicz’s theorem (Theorem 22) holds for I∆0 and any n ∈ N; i.e., there exists a bounded formula
whose o`gn−witness cannot consistently be shortened to o`gn+1. Indeed this theorem holds for any cut I
and its logarithm which is definition the cut J = {x | ∃y[y = exp(x) ∧ y∈I]}. The only relation between
o`gn and o`gn+1 needed in the proof of Theorem 21 is that 2x∈ o`gn ⇐⇒ x∈ o`gn+1; see [3]. And the proof
works for any cut I and J which satisfy ∀x(2x∈ I ⇐⇒ x∈J). The cuts I and J defined above satisfy
this as well (exp(x)∈I ⇐⇒ x∈J ). So, we repeat Theorem 21 as:
Theorem 37 ([3]) There exists a bounded formula η(x) such that the theory I∆0 + ∃x∈Iη(x) is consis-
tent, but I∆0 + ∃x∈J η(x) is not consistent. ⊂⊃
4.2.3 The Main Theorem for I∆0
Let us note that the following theorem together with Theorem 37 prove that I∆0 6` HCon∗(I∆0).
Theorem 38 For any bounded formula θ(x), if the theory I∆0 + ∃x∈Iθ(x) + HCon∗(I∆0) is consistent
then so is the theory I∆0 + ∃x∈J θ(x).
Proof. Suppose the theory I∆0 + ∃x∈Iθ(x) + HCon∗(I∆0) is consistent. So there exists a model
M |= I∆0 +
(
α∈I ∧ θ(α))+ HCon∗(I∆0),
where α∈M. We will show the consistency of I∆0 + ∃x∈J θ(x) by constructing another model
N |= I∆0 + ∃x∈J θ(x).
If α is standard (i.e., α∈N) then one can take N =M. But if α∈M is non-standard, then we proceed as
follows:
Let Υ = {0, 0 + 0, 02, c, c2, c2 + 0, sc, qc, (sc)2, (sc)2 + 0} where q is the Skolem function symbol for the
formula ∃y(y 6 x2 ∧ y = x2) and c is the Skolem constant symbol for the sentence (see Example 12)
∃x(∃w(w 6 x2 ∧ w = x2) ∧ ∀v(v 6 (sx)2 ∧ v 6= (sx)2)).
We can use the argument of Example 12, since for the bounded formula ψ(x) = ∃y 6 x2(y = x · x),
the sentence indψ is an axiom of the theory I∆0. Take Λ = Υ ∪ {j | j 6 ω1(α)} ∪ {zj | j 6 4α4} in
which the terms j’s and zj’s are defined inductively as 0 = 0, j + 1 = sj; and z0 = 2, zj+1 = q(zj). Now
ω2(pΛq) is of order exp2
(
4(logα)4
)
which exists by the assumption M |= α∈I. Then by Theorem 20 for
a non-standard j the set of terms Λ〈j〉 has a code in M. Thus the assumption M |= HCon∗(I∆0) implies
that there must exists an I∆0−evaluation p on Λ〈j〉. Then one can form the model N = M(Λ, p). Now
N |= I∆0 by Lemma 18, and also N |= α/p ∈ J by the definition of z4α4 (which represents exp2(4α4)).
Note that p |= zj+1 = zj ·zj by the argument of Example 12, and also the code of the sequence 〈z0, . . . , z4α4〉
is of order exp
(
(4α4)2
)
6 exp2(4(logα)4) which exists since α∈I. Finally, N |= θ(α/p) by Corollary 35
(of Theorem 34). Whence N is a model of the theory I∆0 + ∃x∈J θ(x); what proves its consistency. bc
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5 Conclusions
An important property of Herbrand consistency of the theories I∆0 + Ω1 and I∆0 has been proved. That
property immediately implies Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for the notion of Herbrand consis-
tency in those theories. However, this version of Go¨del’s theorem has come a long way. The original
presumption of Paris & Wilkie [10] asked for a proof of I∆0 6` CFCon(I∆0), without specifying any vari-
ant of Cut-Free Consistency CFCon: “Presumably I∆0 6` CFCon(I∆0) although we do not know this at
present”. Willard [14] solved this problem for the Tableau Consistency variant. Pudla´k [11] asked a more
specific question: “we know only that T 6` HCon(T ) for T containing at least I∆0 + Exp, for weaker
theories it is an open problem”. In [13] this problem was studied for the theories I∆0 + Ω1 and I∆0 (and
a theory in between these two, namely I∆0 plus the totality of the x 7→ xlog2 x function). The proof of
I∆0 + Ω1 6` HCon(I∆0 + Ω1) given here was presented for the first time in Chapter 5 of [13]. But the
unprovability of HCon(I∆0) in I∆0 was not as easy as it would have seemed. In Chapter 3 of [13] this
unprovability was proved for a re-axiomatization of I∆0.
Our reason for using the induction formula indψ, where ψ(x) is the bounded formula ∃y 6 x2(y = x2),
was having an Skolem function symbol for squaring q(x) = x2. This way the Go¨del code of q(x) is M · pxq
for a fixed M ∈N, and thus the code of qn(x) is Mn · pxq which is of order exp(n). So, we could code a
term representing the number xexp(n) (=qn(x)) by a number of order exp(n). But if we coded the number
xexp(n) directly, that would be the code of x · x · . . . · x (with 2n − times x) which is of order (pxq)2n or
exp2(n). In that case, the code of the sequence 〈z0, . . . , z4α4〉 would be of order exp2((4α4)2), but we used
the order exp
(
(4α4)2
)
in the proof of Theorem 38 (since we had at most exp2(4(logα)4) in our disposal -
which is far less than exp2((4α4)2)). That way, we avoided accepting the totality of the squaring function
Ω0 : ∀x∃y(y = x · x) as an (additional) axiom.
This point deserves another look: define the terms {zi}, {ui}, and {vi} inductively as z0 = 2, zj+1 =
q(zj); u0 = 2, uj+1 = (zj)
2; and v0 = 2, vj+1 = (vj)
2. Then the codes of the terms zn’s and vn’s are of order
P(2n), but the code of vn’s are of order P(22n). On the other hand, the terms zi, ui and vi have the same
value (22
i
) in any model of I∆0. In fact, for i 6 ω1(α) we have zi ∈Λ and also ui ∈Λ〈1〉; but vi’s are too
big to fit in small sets of terms.
Our treatment of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for Herbrand consistency in weak arithmetics,
can be summarized in the following improvements to the classical treatments (cf. the first paragraph of
Appendix E in [15]):
(1) For Skolemizing a formula we did not transform it to a prenex normal form. This allowed a more
efficient Skolemization and Herbrandization of formulas.
(2) Propositional satisfiability was achieved by evaluations, which are partial (Herbrand) models; see also
[2, 3, 4, 8, 12, 13].
(3) For logarithmic shortening of bounded witnesses in I∆0, we could not go from o`g to o`g
2 directly.
Instead we used the condition ω21(x)
4 ∈ o`g (equivalently x∈I) to get to 4x4 ∈ o`g2 (equivalently x∈J ).
For that we used the improved version of Adamowicz’s theorem [3] (Theorem 37).
(4) And finally, we used the trick of indψ to get an Skolem function symbol for the squaring function.
Ideally, one would not use any induction axiom for proving a formula like Ω0 : ∀x∃y(y = x2). This is an
Q−derivable sentence, and adding it as an axiom seems much more natural than proving it by an inductive
argument. But, fortunately, there was a way of avoiding the acceptance of Ω0 as an axiom, and that was
proving its Π1−equivalent ∀x∃y 6 x2(y = x2) by induction on its bounded part ∃y 6 x2(y = x2) (see
Example 12 and the proof of Theorem 38). That induction axiom could give us a free Skolem function
symbol for the squaring operation, provided that we did not prenex normalize the induction axiom, and
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instead Skolemize it more effectively − see point (1) above. Prenex normalizing and then Skolemizing the
induction axioms can be so cumbersome that many would prefer avoiding them, but accepting new axioms
instead! Trying to prenex normalize the induction axiom indψ for ψ = ∃y 6 x2(y = x2) in Example 12
can give a hint for its difficulty.
In the end, we conjecture that by using our coding techniques and definitions of Herbrand consistency, the
results of L. A. Ko lodziejczyk [8] can be generalized for showing the following unprovability:
Conjecture 39
⋃
n(I∆0 + Ωn) 6` HCon∗(I∆0).
Question 40 Can a Book proof (in the words of Paul Erdo¨s) be given for Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem T 6` HCon(T ) for any theory T ⊇ Q and a canonical definition of Herbrand consistency HCon?
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